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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
EQUITY-UNFAIR COMPETITION-UNAUTHORIZED USE BY RETAILER
OF CHARGE PLATES DISTRIBUTED BY RETAIL ASSOCIATION
Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre- Cinderella
Stores, Inc., 215 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1954)
Plaintiff, Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, was incorporated by
certain retail stores to conduct for its members a customer identifica-
tion and credit system using metal "charge plates,", the use of which
saves the time of sales clerks and simplifies billing procedure. The
Associates sought to enjoin the defendant, a retailer not a member of
the association, from using charge plates distributed by the.Associates
to stamp its own sales slips, alleging that this use constituted unfair
competition. A dismissal of the action by a federal district court 2 was
affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the
plaintiff did not retain sufficient property interest in the plates after
their distribution to enable it to enjoin the acts of the defendant3
Before the courts-will enjoin competition as being "unfair," they
must find, first, that the defendant has interfered with a property
interest of the plaintiff-the traditional ground for equity jurisdic-
tion-and second, that the interference is causing actual or potential
economic loss to the plaintiff.4 Of course, all competition exhibits
these characteristics to some degree,5 and it appears that some courts
have been induced by the highly unethical nature of a defendant's
conduct to find the requisite property interest and harm on rather
tenuous grounds.6 Courts have found unfair competition in three
1. Each charge plate bears, in raised letters, the name and address of the
customer to whom it is distributed. When a credit purchase is made the plateis given to the sales clerk, who inserts it into an addressing machine which
stamps the customer's name and address upon the sales slip.
2. Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores,
Inc., 116 F. Supp. 148 (D. Conn. 1953). Federal jurisdiction was based upon
diversity of citizenship, the defendant being a Massachusetts corporation and
the Associates being incorporated under the laws of Connecticut.
3. Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores,
Inc., 215 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1954). It has been generally recognized since Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. (1938), that state law applies in unfair competi-
tion cases not involving a copyright or trade-mark aspect. See Pecheur Lozenge
Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois
Brewing Co., 175 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1949). No Connecticut decisions on the point
involved in the principal case were found, however, and the federal court con-
sequently applied general law.
4. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPEfTITON AN2) TRAbE-MABKS § 88.1 (2d
ed. 1950); 1 Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITIONr AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 6, 9 (4th ed.
1947); 4 PoMERoY, EnuITy JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1337, 1338, 1346, 1347 (5th ed.
1941).
5. 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 708 (1938).
6. 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7; RESTATEMENT, TORTS c. 35, Intro-
ductory Note (1938). In applying this test, if the court feels relief to be appro-
priate, it will go to great lengths to find that an injured plaintiff does have the
property interest requisite to the granting of relief. The outstanding example
is International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), where
the court found a "quasi property" interest in news releases in order to ground
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situations, viz., (1) where the defendant commits a separate wrongful
act such as interference with contractual relations, or infringement
of trade-mark, patent or copyright," (2) where the defendant is
"palming off" its goods as those of the plaintiff in order to take
advantage of the plaintiff's advertising and good will, and (3) where
the defendant appropriates for reproduction and sale' a product,
performance or idea of the plaintiff such as news items1o recorded"1
or broadcast " music, and fashion designs.13
The principal case clearly does not fall within the recognized cate-
gories of unfair competition. The case involves a situation in which
the defendant is reducing its operating costs by utilizing a service of
the plaintiff's existing business system. 4 The plaintiff did not show
that the defendant's activity impaired the efficiency of the associa-
tion's system or that the defendant "palmed" itself off as a member
of the association. The plaintiff based its claim for relief on the alle-
injunctive relief. On the other hand, if the plaintiff clearly has a property inter-
est, the court may go far to find prospective injury. See Lone Ranger, Inc. v.
Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); CALLMIA, op. cit. supra note 4, § 88.L
7. NIMS, UNFAIR CO.IPETITION AND TRADE-DIARKS § 1 (4th ed. 1947).
8. Best & Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1948); Airolite Co. v. Fiedler,
147 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1945). Many courts have stated that "palming off" is an
essential element of unfair competition. E.g., Goodyear's India Rubber Glove
Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888); Addressograph-Multi-
graph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 682 (1942); Stroehrnann Bros. Co. v. Manbeck
Baking Co, 331 Pa. 96, 200 Atl. 97 (1938).
9. It is only within comparatively recent years that courts have recognized
unfair competition in instances of appropriation for reproduction and sale, and
the law in that area is very unsettled. See 2 CALLBIAN, op. cit. supra note 4,§160-62.
10. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
11. Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); see Beecham v.
London Gramophone Corp., 104 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
12. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
N.Y. Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
13. See Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild, 90 F.2d 556, 557(1st Cir. 1937); contra, Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.
1929).
14. In other cases involving the invasion of an established business system,
relief has been granted only where some recognized wrongful element other than
the invasion itself has been present. Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa.
1925), aff'd, 10 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1926) (interference with contract); Prest-O-
Lite Co. v. Davis, 209 Fed. 917 (S.D. Ohio 1913), aff'd, 215 Fed. 349 (6th Cir.
1914) ("palming off").
The situation in the principal case is similar in principle to that found in the
operation of many discount houses which direct potential customers to depart-
meat stores to take advantage of the department stores' personnel and displays
of goods in making a selection of the goods desired. Obtaining the model and
number of certain merchandise, the customer returns to the discount house,
which uses the information to obtain the desired goods. By this means the dis-
count house utilizes the department stores' existing business system in order to
avoid the necessity of keeping on hand a sizeable inventory. However harmful
this practice might be to legitimate dealers, it would indeed be a startling prop-
osition of law to declare that the discount houses were guilty of unfair com-
petition. See Alexander and Hill, What to Do About the Discount House,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1955, pp. 53, 55.
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gation that the defendant was gaining a "free ride" by wrongfully
appropriating for its own benefit something of value rightfully belong-
ing to the plaintiff.15 The issue, therefore, is whether the defendant,
by enriching itself through use of the plaintiff's system, unreason-
ably threatened or caused harm to a property interest of the plaintiff,
and therefore should have been enjoined.
However unethical the defendant's conduct might seem, it was not
held illegal.2r There are two grounds adequate to support this result.
The court said the reason the plaintiff could not maintain the suit was
that it did not retain sufficient property in the plates, after distribut-
ing them without restriction, to provide the basis for an equity
action.27 This rationale is entirely adequate under the conventional
understanding of a property interest. An equally basic reason for the
result of the case is the plaintiff's failure to prove present or potential
harm to itself or to show that the defendant's use of the plates
impaired the efficiency of the plaintiff's system. Hence, there was no
reason for equity to act even if plaintiff could have proved that it
retained a property interest in the plates.
It remains to be seen whether a charge plate association could
strengthen its position by contracting with the individual charge plate
holders that the plates cannot be used in non-member stores. The
use of the plates by a non-member store might then constitute a
separate wrongful act-interference with contractual relations.'
Certainly the contract would provide a strong argument that the asso-
ciation retained a property interest in the plates. 9 In either situation,
the necessity of showing injury still exists, but the principal case does
not foreclose that issue, since the plaintiff, in relying on the wrongful
appropriation theory, did not exhaust all the possibilities of proving
harm. With an unethical act, a recognized property interest, and a
demonstrable loss brought before it, a court would undoubtedly look
more favorably upon granting relief.
15. Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores,
Inc., 215 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1954).
16. The court, moreover, did not seem to think the conduct was unethical. Ibid.
On the necessity for a distinction between unethical and illegal conduct see Perl-
berg v. Smith, 70 N.J. Eq. 638, 642, 62 Atl. 442, 444 (1905). Also see 1 CALLDIAN,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.
17. Hartford Charga-Plate Associates, Inc. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores,
Inc., 215 F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1954).
18. A contract restricting the use of the charge plates might be objectionable
as a servitude upon a chattel, unless it could be shown that the continuing con-
tractual relations between plaintiff's member stores and the plate holders justi-
fied such a restriction. See RCA MIfg. Co. v: Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d. Cir.
1940).
19. The plaintiff might seek to establish a recognized property interest
through a bailment theory, i.e., that customers received charge plates only as
bailees in order to use them in plaintiff's member stores.
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